1. INTRODUCTION

Civil conflicts create a "conflict trap". They perpetuate themselves by destroying economic and social development, and by crippling political institutions rendering them unable to address the underlying grievances [1]. In this article, we empirically demonstrate that ethnic conflicts lead to another very important political change which we argue, should be considered among the self-perpetuating dynamics of these conflicts. We study the Turkish case to show how an ethnic conflict creates a *polarization trap* by feeding the political polarization of the society along ethnic nationalist lines.

Turkey offers a very important opportunity to study how ethnic conflicts affect political behavior in host societies. Since August 1984, the country has been suffering from an ethnic insurgency campaign led by the Kurdish separatist guerilla organization Kurdistan Workers' Party (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan), the PKK. Despite the persistent political violence the electoral process has continued to unfold in a context of democratic elections, and in a political arena which hosts extreme ethnic-nationalist parties. The existence of Kurdish and Turkish ethnic nationalist parties in the political arena enables us to specifically test the effects of the ethnic conflict on the political salience of ethnic issues and on the political salience of ethnic identities themselves because these parties are by definition champions of the particular interests of their ethnic brethren[2]. In this study, relying on a unique casualty database that we have assembled, we analyze the association between the conflict and the vote shares of these ethnic nationalist parties in the 1995 and 1999 general elections. The results reveal a significant positive association between the conflict and both the Turkish-nationalist and Kurdish-nationalist vote shares, and thus, point to an ethnic-nationalist polarization of the electorate. Given the completely opposing views these ethnic parties hold in terms of the conflict and the ways to solve it, the polarization result is telling in terms of how an ethnic conflict perpetuates itself and remains unresolved for almost three decades.

We then argue that these results also tie to the constructivist argument that ethnic groups are fluid and endogenous to a set of social, economic, and political processes, and that individuals have multiple identities whose salience changes over time in response to their environment[3]. We refer to the ecological inference method developed by King (1997) to infer ethnic Kurdish and ethnic Turkish vote choices from aggregate election results[4]. Then we analyze how the ethnic conflict is associated with these estimated ethnic votes. The results reveal the significant positive association the conflict has with both ethnic Kurdish votes for the Kurdish-nationalist party, and ethnic Turkish votes for the Turkish-nationalist party, and thus, indicate that in response to ethnic political violence voters attach more political salience to their ethnic identities in their vote choices.

Our study is closely linked to some recent works which have provided some clues about the type of the association between ethnic conflicts and electoral choice. In their studies on the Palestinian conflict both Gould and Klor, and Berrebi and Klor find a positive association between the attacks and the vote share of the intransigent right-wing parties in Israel[5]. Kibris reaches a similar conclusion for the Turkish case[6]. These studies are of utmost importance because they tell us about how people react to violent conflict, and understanding people's reactions is crucial if we are to figure out the dynamics of these conflicts. Nevertheless, we argue that they provide us with only a partial understanding because they implicitly assume a structure in which a homogenous society is exposed to violence from a single outside source. Ethnic conflicts bid ethnic groups in a society against each other both politically and economically. In most cases civilians are exposed to violence from both the rebels and the state. Consequently, it is difficult to talk about a single unifying threat perception in ethnic conflicts. Moreover, ethnic conflicts activate ethnic identities in a society rather than a common national one, and raise the salience of ethnic issues. Therefore, we expect the association between ethnic conflicts and voting behavior to vary among different groups, and in that sense deepen and maybe even increase the number of cleavages in a society. Our results support our

expectation, and demonstrate that the association manifests itself as an array of different effects which can not be subsumed under a turn towards the right wing. It seems, rather than unifying the the society behind a certain ideology as suggested by the above mentioned previous studies[7], the conflict further fragments and polarizes the society behind opposing camps[8]. This more comprehensive approach to the association between ethnic conlicts and vote choice is one of the main contributions of our study to the literature.

Also important is the construction of the data set on security force causalties (SFCs). This is the first empirical study to look into the association between the ongoing ethnic conflict and the electoral fortunes of ethnic parties in Turkey. The dearth of studies acknowledging this association was not due to the lack of importance or relevance of the issue but was rather due to lack of data on which to build credible measures of the conflict. Our data set provides the first, and so far the only detailed information on casualties. Relying on this data set, it is possible to measure the variation in conflict intensity across time and locations.

Finally, this study contributes to the literature by offering a preliminary empirical test of the constructivist arguments about the positive association between ethnic conflicts and the political salience of ethnic identity. This is an association that carries great importance for the study of ethnic conflicts. Nevertheless, it evades empirical study in most cases due to difficulties associated with simultaneous availability of data on ethnic identity and political behavior.

In the following section, we present a brief overview of the ethnic conflict in Turkey. Then we discuss the theoretical foundations of our study. In the fourth section, we present our model and introduce our variables. The fifth section discusses the data. We present our results in the sixth, conduct robustness tests in the seventh section. Finally, we conclude in section eight.

2. THE CONFLICT IN TURKEY

Ethnic Kurds are the largest ethnic minority in Turkey. A recent survey study puts their percentage in the population to around 16%[9]. Historically, the Turkish state's ethnic policy has consisted of the assimilation of the Kurdish speaking population under the rubric of the Turkish nation and consequently, this large minority has been denied the rights to self expression in the public sphere[10]. Saatci suggests that this dominant and homogenizing Turkish nationalism has in return produced the PKK[11].

The PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan) is a Kurdish separatist guerilla organization that has been conducting armed attacks in Turkey since August 1984. The organization was first founded with the goal of establishing an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey, though by late 1999, it appeared to roll back on its goal to a federational structure that would grant more autonomy to the Kurdish population in Turkey.

The armed conflict between the PKK and the Turkish security forces has been geographically concentrated in southeastern and eastern Turkey which is an underdeveloped part of the country, and which has traditionally been inhabited by ethnic Kurds. While both sides mainly targeted each other's forces and facilities, they have also employed repressive tactics against the civilian populations. The PKK conducted attacks against public servants like teachers, clergymen, administrative officers, and against civilians whom they accused of being "collaborators with the Turkish Republic". Also, as a result of the "village guards" system under which the state employed civilian villagers as armed guards against the insurgents, there were numerous incidents where the PKK attacked these guards and their villages. On the other hand, the Turkish state's responses included the legal persecution and intolerance of Kurdish political demands, and a more sinister counterinsurgency campaign that involved extrajudicial killings in the 90s[12]. Interrupted by short lived cease-fires the armed conflict between the Turkish security forces and the PKK has been

going on for almost thirty years now. It has cost the country billions of dollars, and more than 40 thousand lives[13]. Our knowledge about civilian and insurgent casualties is limited to aggregate numbers sporadically released by contending sources as there is no credible and publicly available dataset on them. Nevertheless, this study, provides us with a unique database on security force (i.e. soldiers and police officers) casualties (SFCs).

As can be clearly seen in Chart 1 below which depicts the total number of SFCs over the years, the 90s has been the most bloody period of the conflict. The PKK received a major blow when its leader Abdullah Öcalan was captured in Africa in 1999, brought back to Turkey, tried and sentenced to life in prison. Headless and divided, the PKK ceased its attacks in the early 2000s. Unfortunately, peace in the area did not last long. The PKK resumed its armed attacks in the second half of 2004.

Chart 1: Total Number of Security Force Casualties



Since the early 90s, the conflict has been considered by the political elite and the public as one of the most important problems facing the country[14], and the ethnic based nationalist cleavage contrasting the Turkish and Kurdish identities has become one of the most dominant cleavages of the ideological competition in the Turkish party system[15] with two ethnic nationalist parties, one on the Turkish and one on the Kurdish side, as the flagbearers of this competition.

The MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) is an extreme Turkish-nationalist party with the

most uncompromising, militarist position towards the Kurdish issue. The party has never acknowledged a separate Kurdish ethnic identity[16], and consequently defined the problem as one of terrorism supported by foreign governments. Party officials have always supported military solutions to the conflict, accused those who advocated granting political rights and freedoms to the Kurdish minority with attempting to disintegrate the country, and threatened to spill blood to prevent any kind of political concessions[17].

HADEP (People's Democracy Party) was a Kurdish-nationalist political party founded to take up the Kurdish cause and work for a political solution, after its predecessors HEP and DEP were closed down by the Constitutional Court. HEP (People's Labor Party) was the first pro-Kurdish party in Turkey. It was formed in 1990, but due to some legal constraints, could not enter the 1991 general election. Instead 22 HEP members joined the left-wing Socialist People's Party (SHP) and were voted into the parliament within the party lists of SHP[18]. During its brief lifespan, HEP criticized the policy of the Turkish state against the Kurdish minority, stating that the Kurdish issue could not be reduced to a terrorism problem, and insisted that a political solution was urgently needed. It condemned the military option and stressed that the PKK was not a terrorist movement, but rather, a political organization. It argued that the government should immediately begin a process of dialogue which would also include the PKK as one of the sides, and HEP as the mediator. They demanded cultural rights and political freedoms for the Kurdish minority. HEP was closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1993. Party members reorganized under the roof of DEP (Democracy Party) whose life span turned out to be even shorter than its predecessor. The Constitutional Court closed the party down in 1994. Expecting this closure, party members were already organized under the banner of HADEP (People's Democracy Party) which then lived long enough to compete in the 1995 and 1999 general elections[19].

3. ETHNIC CONFLICT AND VOTE CHOICE

The theoretical insights for the association between ethnic conflict and vote choice stems from several literatures[20]. At the very basic level we expect political behavior to be a product of personal characteristics and environmental factors including socioeconomic conditions and social networks[21]. A large literature of empirical works which have started to accumulate as early as the 1950s supports this argument and demonstrates the impact of environmantal factors on turnout, vote choice, partisanship and political preferences[22].

Civil conflicts create profound social changes. They reverse socioeconomic development; trigger emigration; redistribute wealth and power in the society and consequently, change the relative status of groups; and create and intensify hatreds[23]. Wood categorizes these changes under six social processes: political mobilization, military socialization, the polarization of social identities, the militarization of local authority, the transformation of gender roles, and the fragmentation of the local political economy[24]. And she specifically argues that wartime polarization may lead to electoral polarization, segregation, and a distrustful political culture.

The theory of issue voting labels social factors as issues and presents them as important determinants of vote choice. According to this theory people vote for those candidates whose positions on and salience attribution to issues they find similar to their own. Accordingly, parties benefit from the salience of issues to which they are generally viewed as attaching highest priority[25]. The salience of an issue varies over time and over individuals. The more salient the issue, the greater the expected effect of issue ownership and issue proximity on an individual's voting decision[26].

Civil conflicts raise the political salience of security issues, and also the salience of those issues surrounding the conflict[27]. Violence creates security threats. A large body of literature in political psychology shows that threat perception increases prejudice, aggression towards others,

and voting tendencies towards extreme right-wing parties who support aggressive policies to deal with these threats[28]. In the Israeli case empirical findings show that feelings of insecurity increase with every terrorist attack mounted against civilians[29], and that security threats are important predictors of the vote for radical right-wing parties[30].

We can also gather theoretical insights from the constructivist arguments and the related literature about how identity varies as a function of environmental incentives and strategic manipulation[31]. Chandra and Wilkinson differentiate between nominal identities which are "those identity categories in which an individual is eligible for membership based on the attributes that she or he possesses"; and activated identities which are those that the individual choses among her nominal identities to guide her behavior[32]. An important point here is that identity activation is endogenous: It very much depends on the salience of group-specific attributes which in turn are determined by the social context[33]. Ethnic conflicts provide drastic examples of how the social context activates certain identities. Wilkinson and Haid argue that instead of being the product of already solid ethnic identities, ethnic conflicts are best seen as an exercise in increasing the salience of some dimensions and agendas over others[34]. Wilkinson even argues that ethnic conflicts are provoked by political entrepreneurs to mobilize constituents around one ethnic identity rather than another[35]. Indeed, Appadurai analyzes the genocide in Rwanda as a form of community-building, a strategy designed to strengthen the identity of the perpetrators[36]. Manning and Roy argue that national identification is sensitive to patterns of conflict by providing empirical evidence that Catholics from Northern Ireland rarely think of themselves as British while a majority of Protestants do[37]. Shayo and Zussman show how the Palestinian conflict affects judges in Israel and demonstrate that attacks lead Arab judges to favor Arab plaintiffs and Jewish judges to favor Jewish plaintiffs[38]. Shayo and Sambanis argue that ethnic conflicts not only make ethnic attributes more salient to individuals but they also tend to make ethnic differences more prominent, and thereby

reduce perceived similarity to the nation as a whole[39]. These conflicts also destroy and reallocate resources between groups, which can directly affect both national and group status. In the Turkish case, for example, Saatci discusses how the conflict impoverished thousands of Kurds by dislocating them from their villages[40]. Finally, Byman points to the role of state repression in ethnic conflicts in terms of identity creation, and argues how the Sri Lankan government's violent response to Tamil Tigers has created the perception that the Sri Lankan state and army act only in the interest of the Sinhalese[41]. Similarly, Saatci depicts the Turkish-Kurdish conflict as a "double-edged sword" which has contributed to the growth of ethnic consciuosness and nationalism on both the Turkish and the Kurdish side[42].

To summarize, theory offers us three main arguments based on which we can expect to see an association between ethnic conflicts and vote choice: civil conflicts have profound effects on the socioeconomic and political environment which in turn impacts upon vote choice; people tend to vote for those candidates whose position on and salience attribution to issues are similar to their own, and civil conflicts affect the relative salience of security issues and the issues surrounding the conflict; ethnic conflicts activate ethnic identities and activated identities are those that shape our political behavior.

4. THE MODEL

The data set comprises two observations for each county[43], one for the 1995 general election and one for the 1999 general election. Note that the data exhibit a multilevel character: the observations are chronologically nested within counties, which in turn are geographically nested within provinces. The presence of layers may violate the standard OLS assumption of independent error terms if unobserved factors at the county and province levels lead the error terms to be correlated. Ignoring the multilevel character of data risks erroneously low coefficient standard errors, and consequently, increases the risk of declaring significant effects for predictors which in

fact have none[44]. To account for that risk we use the following multilevel linear model in which unobserved county and province level factors are incorporated as random effects:

$$V_{\{t,i,j\}} = \alpha + \beta C_{\{t,i,j\}} + \theta N_{\{t,i,j\}} + \varphi K_{\{t,i,j\}} + \gamma X_{\{t,i,j\}} + \omega E_{\{t\}} + \Omega M_{\{t,i,j\}} + \rho_{\{j\}} + u_{\{i,j\}} + \varepsilon_{\{t,i,j\}}$$

where $\rho_{\{j\}}$ is the province level error component, $u_{\{i,j\}}$ is the county level error component, and $\varepsilon_{\{t,i,j\}}$ is the individual observation level error component, with $E(\varepsilon_{\{t,i,j\}})=0$, $Var(\varepsilon_{\{t,i,j\}}) =\sigma^2$; $E(u_{\{i,j\}})=0$ $Var(u_{\{i,j\}})=\tau^2$; $E(\rho_{\{j\}})=0$, $Var(\rho_{\{j\}})=\varsigma^2$; and Cov $[\varepsilon_{\{t,i,j\}},u_{\{i,j\}}]=0$, Cov $[\varepsilon_{\{t,i,j\}}, \rho_{\{j\}}]=0$, and Cov $[u_{\{i,j\}}, \rho_{\{j\}}]=0$.

$V_{\{t,i,j\}}$ is the vote share of the party on whose votes we explore the effects of the ethnic conflict. We first explore the effects of the conflict on the vote share of the Kurdish-nationalist party HADEP, and then we explore the effects on the vote share of the Turkish-nationalist MHP. t denotes the time of election, i denotes the county and j denotes the province. $C_{\{t,i,j\}}$ is the number of SFCs who died in the fight against the PKK since the previous election; $N_{\{t,i,j\}}$ is the turnout rate; $K_{\{t,i,j\}}$ is the percentage of ethnically Kurdish population; $X_{\{t,i,j\}}$ is a vector of socioeconomic, and demographic control variables; $E_{\{t\}}$ is an election dummy that takes on the value 1 for the 1995 general election and zero for the 1999 general election; and $M_{\{t,i,j\}}$ is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if county i of province j was under state of emergency at the time of election t[45].

We employ the number of SFCs who died in the fight against the PKK in each county since the previous general election as a measure of conflict intensity[46]. Admittedly, our measure falls short of the total number of casualties which is the most commonly used measure of conflict intensity in the literature. But, as we mentioned above, there is no detailed, complete and credible panel data available on civilian and insurgent casualties. Hence our data on the SFCs constitute the only available measure that can be used to assess the variation in the intensity of the conflict over time and space. Moreover, we argue that it is a good measure first because we expect it to be highly correlated with the total number of casualties and the total number of attacks, and second because it

is a good measure of PKK presence in an area. While lack of data on civilian and insurgent casualties, and PKK attacks prevents us from studying how correlated our measure would be with such series across counties or provinces over time, the yearly aggregate numbers reported by the Turkish General Staff[47] and the Federation of American Scientists (www.fas.org) enable us to present some evidence of the correlation at the country level. The yearly country-wide aggregates we have for the number of SFCs is 84% correlated with the yearly total casualty, and 98% correlated with the yearly total PKK attack numbers that the Turkish General Staff reported. The correlation between the yearly total casualty numbers reported by the Federation of American Scientists is even higher at 97.4%. These high correlations are not surprising considering the fact that attacks by the PKK, and offensive military operations by the Turkish security forces claim lives from both sides. Unfortunately they also claim the lives of civilians. Also, village guards make up a significant portion of total casualties, and in many cases village guards get killed alongside security forces in PKK attacks on their villages, or during search or pursuit missions in the area. Another major cause of civilian casualties is landmines laid down by both sides. Needless to say, landmine casualties among security forces and civilians are expected to be highly correlated.

Moreover, we expect SFCs to be a strong predictor of PKK casualties as offensive military operations by Turkish security forces usually follows PKK attacks, especially so when those attacks result in heavy casualties on the security forces' side. Once again, lack of data prevents us from supporting our claim by empirical evidence from the Turkish case. Nevertheless, Jaeger and Paserman's[48] study reveals a similar dynamic in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. They find that the incidence and levels of Palestinian fatalities can be predicted by the incidence and levels of Israeli fatalities in the past two months.

Most importanly, as the correlation between the number of SFCs and PKK attacks clearly demonstrate, SCFs is a good measure of the PKK presence in the area. The presence of PKK

insurgents and activity in an area causes a great deal of inconvenience for the civilian residents. Not only it means that they can get caught in crossfire, or become a landmine victim, it also means that their daily lives are disturbed by the heightened security measures like the increased number of security personnel in the area, and the frequent security checks and controls that are imposed on the civilians, and also by the frequent interruption of economic activity as a result of attacks and armed skirmishes between security forces and the PKK. In many cases it also means that they will be pressured, threatened or even killed by combatants who may accuse them of collaborating with the enemy. Thus, we argue that, SFCs provide a good measure of the intensity of the conflict and the level of political violence civilians are exposed to.

The vector of socioeconomic and demographic variables $X_{\{t,i,j\}}$ includes population size, population growth rate, level of urbanization, unemployment rate, average household size and literacy rate.

Population measures are frequently used variables in modeling electoral behavior[49]. Population size measures the total population of the county in thousands; population growth rate is the average yearly growth rate of the county population since the last census; and level of urbanization is the percentage of county population living in the county center. Population size and the level of urbanization in a locality may influence vote choice through their effects on the availability of and level of exposure to alternative sources of information. Population growth rate reflects the migration patterns in a locality which may have an influence on the vote choice of inhabitants.

One of the stylized facts of the economic voting literature is that voting reacts to a few macroeconomic variables, mainly unemployment and inflation[50]. Unfortunately, there are no county (nor province) level inflation data available for Turkey. Accordingly, the rate of unemployment, which is the number of unemployed per hundred persons in labor force serves as our

macroeconomic control variable.

The average household size is a proxy to capture the center-periphery distinction in the Turkish society. In his seminal work, which has heavily influenced the literature on electoral behavior in Turkey, Mardin argues that the center-periphery relations provide a good explanatory scheme to understand Turkish politics[51]. According to this scheme, the Turkish political system is composed of a coherent body of nationalist, laicist, etatist, educated, urban, "elite" which constitutes the "center; and a "periphery" constituted by the more traditional, more conservative, more religious, more rural, "antietatist" populations. The center-periphery divide in the Turkish politics nicely coincides with the left-right divide. Recent survey studies confirm that the center-periphery framework still retains its validity for Turkish politics[52]. Çarkoğlu and Hinich based on the results of a 2001 survey, conclude that two dimensions dominate the ideological competition in the Turkish party system: the secularist vs. pro-Islamist cleavage which again largely overlaps with the center versus periphery formations in Turkish politics; and the ethnic based nationalist cleavage contrasting the Turkish and Kurdish identities[53].

Household size is a good measure of conservatism as it is positively correlated with the level of religious conservatism, and agricultural employment, and negatively correlated with the education level of women. Thus, we argue that it can be used to capture the center-periphery dichotomy.

Finally, literacy rate is included as a measure of political awareness, and social development in a county.

5. DATA

5.1. Data on Security Force Casualties

The casualty data set includes the date, and place of death at the county level for a total of 6802 SFCs who died in the fight against the PKK between August 1984 and January 2012. The

period in between the 1991 and 1999 general elections, which is the period we will be focusing on in our analyses, harbors 4794 of them. This is a unique data set that we constructed by bringing together the information we obtained from numerous sources including the Turkish General Staff, Ministry of Defense, Administration of Police Forces, local administrations, civil society organizations, and newspaper archieves. We explain the data collection process and the sources we referred to in detail in the Appendix.

Our data set constitutes the only available detailed information on the casualties of the conflict in Turkey. Nevertheless, it has its limitations. First of all, we only have information on the security force casualties. Admittely, a better measure would include civilian and insurgent casualties as well, but unfortunately there is no credible and publicly available information on them. On the other hand, we are confident in the reliability of our data on SFCs. As we explain in more detail in the Appendix, the information for the casualties of the 1984-September 1998 period comes directly from the Turkish Ministry of Defense personnel archieves. This is actualy the most reliable source for this type of information, and consequently we do not expect to have any unaccounted or misreported casualties for this period. Furthermore, to guarantee the reliability of our information on the SFCs of the October 1998 - April 1999 period we referred to several sources simultaneously, in many cases including the families of the deceased, and cross checked the information on each casualty.

The second limitation of our data set is that we only have information on place of death at the county level. While some of these casualties took place in or close to villages, towns or cities, some of the soldiers were killed in clashes in remote mountaneous areas quite far from populated centers. Because we do not have the exact location of death, we are not able to control for the distance of the violent act to the nearest settlement, and consequently, we treat all casualties the same in terms of their impact on voters.

Chart 2(a) and Chart 2(b) below provide visual representations of the distribution of SFCs at the county level in the 1991-1995, and the 1995-1999 period respectively. They reveal the concentration of PKK attacks in southeastern Turkey[54].

Chart 2(a): The Distribution of SFCs, 1991-1995

Chart 2(b) :The Distribution of SCFs, 1995-1999

5.2. Data on Elections

We employ the county level results of the December 24th, 1995, and April 18th, 1999 parliamentary elections. The data are obtained from the Turkish Institute of Statistics. The usage of county level data on actual vote choice is an important aspect of this study. Note that most studies in the literature employ individual level survey data to analyze the association between conflict and political attitudes and behavior. Individual level survey data allows researchers to more effectively control for exposure to violence, and personal characteristics of voters including psychological and perceptional factors, level of awareness, ideological preferences, and party identification which are important determinants of vote choice. Nevertheless, it also raises significant concerns in terms of representativeness of the sample, and in terms of non-response and response biases. In many cases the intensity of the conlict, security concerns, or limitations imposed by the authorities may render it impossible to reach certain locations and their residents. Moreover, declarations may always differ from actual behavior, especially when respondents try to give the "appropriate" answers, or refrain from answering certain questions. Usage of county-level actual votes eliminates such concerns. We should also emphasize the importance of studying the actual political reaction of people to conflict because, in nonauthoritarian societies, this reaction greatly influences government policies.

Turkey had 7 general elections since the start of armed attacks by the PKK in 1984. We focus on the 1995 and 1999 general elections for several reasons. First of all, a Kurdish-nationalist party competed only in the 1995, 1999, and 2002 general elections[55].

Our second reason for focusing on the 1995 and 1999 general elections is the limited availability of county level socieconomic indicators. The only source of country-wide socieconomic data at the county level in Turkey is the population censuses which were held every five years between 1965 and 2000, with the unfortunate exception of 1995. After 2000, the five-yearly

censuses were completely abandoned to be replaced by a new computerized system of population registration. Unfortunately, during the transition period which lasted until 2007, no county level data were released. In short, we only have 1990 and 2000 values for our county level socioeconomic controls, and this obliges us to choose two elections among the feasible three. The choice about which elections to study is actually dictated by the cease-fire that lasted from the second half of 1999 until 2004. The fact that the PKK ceased its attacks between the 1999 and 2002 elections renders our measure of ethnic conflict inappropriate for the period. Consequently, we use the indicators derived from the 1990 census results as our socioeconomic controls for the 1995 general election, and the ones derived from the 2000 census results as our controls for the 1999 general elections[56].

Table 1 displays the major political parties that entered the 1995 and 1999 elections, the percentage of votes they received, and their general ideological placement[57].

Table 1: Political parties that entered the 1995 and 1999 general elections, and the percentage votes they received	1995	1999
ANAP (center-right)	19.6	13.22
DSP (center-left)	14.6	22.19
DYP (center-right)	19.2	12.01
HADEP (Kurdish-nationalist)	4.2	4.75
MHP (Turkish-nationalist)	8.2	17.98
RP/FP (pro-Islamist)	21.4	15.41
CHP (center-left)	10.7	8.7

5.3. Data on Socioeconomic and Demographic Indicators

We derive our socioeconomic variables from two county-level development studies conducted by the State Planning Agency based on the 1990 and 2000 censuses[58].

The data set also contains an estimate of the ethnically Kurdish population percentage in each county. The derivation and inclusion of a control for the ethnic distribution of population across counties is a rather important aspect of this study. Although it is quite obvious that a model

trying to capture the electoral response to ethnic political violence should control for the ethnic make up of the society, the lack of data dictates their omission in many cases leading to spuriousness concerns. The inclusion of this control eases such concerns for our analyses.

We derive our Kurdish population estimates by combining the results of the 1965 census with those of the 1990 and 2000 censuses. The 1965 population census is the last census in Turkey to include questions about mother tongue. Considering those who reported Kurdish as their mother tongue in 1965 as ethnically Kurdish, and aggregating the results at the province level, Mutlu (1993) reports the 1965 Kurdish population percentages of provinces in Turkey[59]. Combining these 1965 provincial percentages, and the 1990 and 2000 census results which provide information on birthplace distribution of county residents, we derived average expected Kurdish population percentages for counties for 1990 and 2000. To do this, we used the 1965 provincial Kurdish population percentages as probabilities of being Kurdish for people who were born in those provinces[60]. These estimates put the total of ethnic Kurds in Turkey to 14% of the population in 1990, and to little more than 15% in 2000. Note that the estimate for 2000 is very close to the result of the 2006 survey study we have mentioned before which puts the total to 15.6%[61].

Table 2 displays the mean values and standard deviations for the control variables included in the analyses. The table distinguishes between counties that suffered at least one SFC in the periods we are interested in and those with no casualties.

Table 2: Summary statistics
(C) gives the mean value for counties with at least one SFC in between the general elections.
(NC) gives the mean value for counties with no casualty in the same period.
Values in parentheses are standard deviations.

		1995	1999
Number of counties	C: NC:	179 678	133 737
SFCs since the previous election	C: NC:	16.99 (32.15) 0 (0)	9.86 (16.63) 0 (0)
Percentage of Kurdish population	C: NC:	43.78 (27.49) 5.03 (10.34)	46.45 (27.00) 7.10 (13.09)
Turnout rate	C: NC:	80.04 (7.12) 86.13 (6.18)	84.04 (4.58) 90.03 (3.98)
Population size	C: NC:	78.80 (12.11) 45.92 (63.56)	86.42 (14.48) 56.06 (98.56)
Population growth rate (%)	C: NC:	1.16 (3.26) 0.94 (2.58)	0.28 (2.83) 0.49 (1.99)
Level of Urbanization (%)	C: NC:	37.14 (20.07) 37.21 (17.60)	46.01 (20.67) 43.59 (18.26)
Household size	C: NC:	6.41 (0.93) 5.16 (0.92)	6.68 (1.49) 4.95 (1.21)
Unemployment rate (%)	C: NC:	5.25 (3.75) 3.78 (2.52)	5.32 (5.48) 5.97 (3.81)
Literacy rate	C: NC:	63.37 (14.47) 78.63 (7.56)	74. 11 (10.81) 85.13 (6.36)

6. RESULTS

6.1. The Vote Share of Kurdish-Nationalists

We estimate our model using the restricted maximum likelihood (REML)[62] estimation technique.

The column on the left in Table 3 below presents the results of the regression analyses testing the effects of the conflict on the vote share of the Kurdish-nationalist HADEP. The estimated coefficient of SFCs is positive and highly significant. Each additional SFC, on the average is associated with a 0.09 percentage point increase in the vote share of HADEP. The magnitude of this result is better understood by considering that the average number of SFCs in the 109 counties which were under the state of emergency in the 1991-1995 period was 24, and that there were 23 counties with more than 50 casualties, and 6 with more than 100. In other words, the ethnic conflict was, on the average, associated with a 2 percentage point increase in the vote share of HADEP in the 1995 election in counties under the state of emergency, and with more than 5 percentage point increase in counties with casualties over 50. Chart 3 below visualizes the results. It depicts what happens to HADEP votes when you move from a county with no SFCs to a county with average number of SFCs, holding everything else constant[63]. The curve on the left plots the density of expected HADEP vote share in a county with no SFCs. The curve to the right plots the density in a county with 17 SCFs, which is the average number of SFCs in counties with positive casualties. As the chart demonstrates, HADEP votes go up by about 2 percentage points on the average as the number of SFCs increase from zero to 17. The simulation exercise when controls are set at their mean values for 1999 yields a very similar picture.

Note that some of the socioeconomic controls like household size, literacy rate and unemployment rate turn out to be highly significantly and substantially associated with HADEP votes. One explanation for these results might the cultural differences between ethnic Kurds and Turks, and the religious conservatism of ethnically Kurdish populations in Turkey. Consequently, ethnic Kurds tend to have higher birth rates, live in bigger households, and have lower literacy rates, especially among women. In fact, as can be seen in Table.A6 in the Appendix, our estimates for the ethnically Kurdish population are 65% correlated with household size, and 69% correlated

with literacy rate across counties for the period we are analyzing[64]. In other words, along with our ethnic population estimates, these controls might be picking up the ethnic dimension of the votes for HADEP. The significant, highly substantial and negative association between houshold size and MHP vote share supports this argument as well. The significant association between unemployment rate and HADEP votes might be due to the fact that HADEP, in terms of economic policy, was a leftist party which supported socialist ideals and a welfare state. The low correlation between unemployment rate and ethnic Kurdish population estimates across counties does not support arguments based on ethnic discrimination in employment. Finally, one can argue that the detrimental impacts of the conflict on economic activity might lead to higher unemployment rates in the conflict zone, which might then impact upon vote choices. While this is a valid argument, the near zero correlation between unemployment rate and SFCs across counties, and the fact that we fail to see any significant impact on the vote share of Turkish nationalists lead us to think that it can only be a partial one.

Chart 3:Simulated HADEP Vote Shares



TABLE 3: Effect on the Vote Share of Ethnic-Nationalist Parties
Estimates from the mixed effects REML regressions

Number of obs.: 1727	Dependent Variable	Dependent Variable
Number of groups Province:80 County:870	**Vote share of HADEP**	**Vote share of MHP**
Constant	7.688 (3.456)	24.39*** (4.92)
SFCs since the previous election	**0.09***** **(0.012)**	**0.08***** **(0.017)**
Percentage of ethnically Kurdish population	0.205*** (0.024)	-0.137** (0.037)
Turnout	-0.057** (0.026)	0.058 (0.036)
Population size	0.006*** (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)
Population growth rate	0.188*** (0.053)	0.147* (0.078)
Urbanization level	-0.011 (0.013)	-0.013 (0.016)
Household size	0.915*** (0.194)	-1.444*** (0.262)
Unemployment rate	0.243*** (0.053)	0.111 (0.075)
Literacy rate	-0.084*** (0.028)	-0.013 (0.034)
Election dummy	-1.214*** (0.284)	-10.24*** (0.401)
State of emergency dummy	-0.357 (0.840)	3.325** (1.482)
Variance Components		
Province level (ς^2)	3.26*** (0.363)	6.21*** (0.569)
County level (τ^2)	4.99*** (0.148)	3.30*** (0.211)
Observation level (σ^2)	2.77*** (0.067)	4.97*** (0.124)
-2 Log Likelihood:	10327	11242

***:significant at 1% level; **:significant at 5% level; *:significant at 10% level.

6.2. The Vote Share of Turkish-Nationalists

The column on the right in Table 3 above displays the results for the second set of regressions investigating the effects of the conflict on the vote share of Turkish-nationalists. Each additional SFC is, on the average, associated with a 0.08 percentage point increase MHP's vote share. In other words, the ethnic conflict is, on the average, associated with a 2 percentage point increase in the vote share of MHP in the 1995 election in counties under the state of emergency, and with more than 4 percentage point increase in counties with casualties over 50. Chart 4 below visualizes the results. It depicts what happens to MHP votes when you move from a county with no SFCs to a county with average number of SFCs, holding everything else constant. The bell shaped curve on the left plots the density of expected MHP vote share in a county with no SFCs, while the curve to the right plots the density of expected MHP vote share in a county with 17 SCFs. As can be seen, MHP votes are on the average 2 percentage points higher in counties with average number of SFCs. The simulation exercise when controls are set at their mean values for 1999 yields a very similar picture.

Chart 4:Simulated MHP Vote Shares



The results on the vote shares of the ethnic nationalist parties reveal that the ongoing ethnic conflict in Turkey is associated with a rise in both Kurdish and Turkish nationalism in the country[65].

To provide a more complete picture of the effects of the conflict on the electoral landscape we also examine the individual vote shares of the other parties that competed in the 1995 and 1999 elections. Table A1 in the Appendix reports the results of the regressions when the dependent variable is the individual vote share of ANAP, RP, CHP, DYP, and DSP respectively. The first three of these parties had a relatively moderate stance on the Kurdish question during the time period we are analyzing[66]. The results clearly demonstrate the negative association between the ethnic conflict and the vote shares of these moderate parties. The remaining two, DYP and DSP, ideologically stood somewhere in between the moderates and the extreme MHP on the Kurdish-Turkish nationalist cleavage[67]. Note that we fail to find any significant association between the vote shares of these two parties and the ethnic conflict in the period under study.

The results clearly demonstrate how the ethnic conflict in Turkey increases the political salience of ethnic nationalism, and polarizes the electorate along an ethnic nationalist cleavage. In that sense they support the theoretical insights about the positive association between ethnic conflicts and the salience of ethnic issues. They are also in line with the issue voting and issue ownership arguments. The conflict is pushing the electorate towards extreme ethnic nationalists who are perceived to be the champions of ethnic issues while hurting the political success of those with relatively moderate stances. Moreover, they support Wood's (2008) argument about the electorally polarizing effects of civil conflicts[68]. Polarization has vast ramifications for a country's political system. As argued in Sartori's seminal work, polarization causes centrifugal pressures that shift away the support for centrist parties and inhibit the formation of stable parliamentary majorities[69]. This directly leads to the fragmentation and destabilization of democratic regimes. In addition, polarization is likely to cause both social conflict and marked fluctuations of public

policies, thus undermining the country's political and economic performance. In the case of ethnic conflicts, polarization along an ethnic nationalist cleavage does not really bode well for a peaceful and timely resolution as the poles tend to have irreconcilable views on the issues surronding the conflict and the ways to deal with them. Polarization then implies that these irreconcilable views are taking hold in the society more and more as a result of the conflict itself. Collier et al. discuss how civil conflicts through their adverse effects on the economy create a trap that makes peaceful resolution even more difficult[70]. The results we have here point to another trap ethnic conflicts create, namely, the ***polarization trap***. Given the adverse effects of polarization, these results can help us understand why civil conflicts last long; why they do not end in peaceful, negotiated settlements more often; and why they leave societies marked for future conflict.

6.3 Ethnic Conflicts and Ethnic Identity

The task that remains now is to understand the characteristics of the observed electoral polarization. If the constructivist insight about the endogeneity of ethnic identity to ethnic conflicts is valid then we can expect this polarization to actually be a reflection of an ethnic polarization that is associated with the conflict. Unfortunately, because we do not have individual level data we can not say anything about the ethnic make up of votes. Nevertheless, the ethnic nationalist appeal of the political parties under investigation here, the ethnic nature of the conflict, and the significant positive (negative) association between the Kurdish population percentages and the vote share of Kurdish nationalists (Turkish-nationalists) lead us to hypothesize that what we are seeing is in fact a positive association between the conflict and ethnic Kurdish votes for the Kurdish-nationalists, and similarly a positive association between the conflict and ethnic Turkish votes for the Turkish-nationalists. And if that is the case then it means that ethnic conflicts not only raise the political salience of ethnic issues in a society in general, but also raise the political salience of ethnic identity

itself among ethnic groups in the society, and that the constructivists are making a valid argument. So far, due to lack of individual level data, and the difficulty of measuring concepts like identity and salience of identity, literature offers limited empirical evidence to support this argument. And in many cases, the evidence does not go beyond anectodal references to the "legacy of hatred"[71].

Unfortunately, the Turkish case also suffers from the lack of individual level data on ethnic identity and vote choice. Nevertheless, King offers us a method of "reconstructing individual behavior from aggregate data"[72]. King's ecological inference (ei) methodology allows us to use the ethnic population percentages we derived to estimate the ethnic Kurdish and Turkish[73] votes for HADEP and MHP in the 1995 and 1999 general elections[74]. We then use these estimates to test whether the conflict increases the political salience of ethnic identities.

The results of this exercise are presented in Table 4 below. We reestimate our base model using the estimated ethnic Kurdish and Turkish votes for HADEP and MHP respectively as our dependent variable. The estimated parameters reveal the significant positive association between the conflict and the votes the two ethnic nationalist parties receive from their coethnics. In other words, they give support to the conjecture that the conflict increases the political salience of ethnic identity leading ethnic Kurds to vote for Kurdish-nationalists, and ethnic Turks to vote for Turkish-nationalists[75].

Note that these results should be viewed as substantially more speculative than the main results presented in Table 3, and should not be taken as conclusive evidence since they are not based on a very rich set of information to begin with. Given the fact that actual ethnic votes are not observable, and that ecological inferences expose one to the risk of ecological fallacies, we present these results cognizant of their limitations. We argue that the results, should be read as preliminary evidence and as a suggestion that future research should take into account the constructivist arguments about the endogeneity of ethnic identity to ethnic conflicts.

TABLE 4: Effects of the Ethnic Conflict on Ethnic Votes for Ethnic-Nationalists				
Estimates from the mixed effects REML regressions				
	Dependent Variable			
# of observations:1727 # of groups:870	Turkish votes for HADEP	Kurdish votes for HADEP	Turkish votes for MHP	Kurdish votes for MHP
Constant	5.366*** (1.46)	48.32*** (7.37)	24.25*** (5.99)	2.428*** (0.680)
SFCs since the previous election	**-0.008** **(0.005)**	**0.080***** **(0.026)**	**0.103***** **(0.021)**	**0.011***** **(0.002)**
Percentage of ethnically Kurdish population	-0.022*** (0.008)	-0.035 (0.057)	0.025 (0.042)	0.003 (0.005)
Turnout	-0.001 (0.011)	-0.167*** (0.055)	0.066 (0.045)	0.008 (0.005)
Population size	-0.001 (0.001)	0.018*** (0.004)	-0.005* (0.003)	-0.0004 (0.0003)
Population growth rate	0.143 (0.095)	0.356*** (0.111)	0.143 (0.095)	0.015 (0.011)
Urbanization level	0.022 (0.023)	-0.014 (0.027)	-0.028 (0.019)	-0.003 (0.002)
Household size	0.318*** (0.079)	1.599*** (0.414)	-1.737*** (0.321)	-0.189*** (0.036)
Unemployment rate	-0.009 (0.023)	0.482*** (0.112)	0.146 (0.093)	0.016 (0.011)
Literacy rate	-0.066*** (0.011)	-0.274*** (0.060)	0.006 (0.04)	0.0002 (0.004)
Election dummy	-0.693*** (0.119)	-3.207*** (0.603)	-10.60*** (0.487)	-1.189*** (0.056)
State of emergency dummy	-0.225 (0.353)	-1.013 (1.781)	0.940 (1.725)	0.108 (0.197)
Variance components are not reported.				
-2 Log Likelihood	7372	12927	11929	4463
***:significant at 1% level; ** :significant at 5% level; * :significant at 10% level.				

7. ROBUSTNESS TESTS

We have performed several robustness checks on the main results presented in Table 3. These tests show that the positive association between the ethnic conflict and the vote shares of ethnic nationalist parties are robust to alternative specifications of the model, and the conflict measure used in the analyses, as well as to excluding outlier observations from the sample. The

results of the tests are presented in the Appendix. Table A2 presents the results when the number of SFCs include those who died in attacks in neighboring counties as well[76]. Table A3 presents the results when the model is specified with fixed province effects and county level clustered errors. Table A4 presents the results when outlier observations are excluded from the data set[77]. As can be seen, the results remain robust.

7.2 Reverse Causality

One concern in estimating the effects of political violence on vote choice is that there may be a dynamic interaction between these two variables. In other words, while violence may influence voting behavior, it may also be staged in response to electoral choices. In such a case, estimates of the effects of political violence on vote choice will be biased. Note that the situation in Turkey does not warrant such a concern. As we have already mentioned, PKK attacks have been concentrated in southeastern Turkey. The area is chosen not because of its residents' electoral profile but because it was claimed as part of the Kurdish homeland by the PKK, and also because the mountainous terrain, which borders Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Armenia, helped guerilla warfare and provided the insurgents with shelters, and escape routes. Moreover most attacks targeted military facilities rather than civilian targets. Nevertheless, to scientifically assess that reverse causality is not creating any specification problems in our analyses, we estimated the coefficients of the following equation to see if the number of SFCs in between two elections is determined by the results of the prior election:

$$C_{\{t,i,j\}}=\alpha + \beta C_{\{t-1,i,j\}}+\eta V_{\{t-1,i,j\}}+\theta N_{\{t-1,i,j\}}+\varphi K_{\{t-1,i,j\}} + \gamma X_{\{t-1,i,j\}} +\Omega M_{\{t-1,i,j\}}+ \rho S_{\{i,j\}} +\varepsilon_{\{t,i\}}$$

where t denotes the election year, i denotes the county, and j denotes the province. $C_{\{t,i,j\}}$ is the number of SFCs who died in the fight against the PKK insurgency between the election at (t-1) and the election at t in county i of province j; $C_{\{t-1,i,j\}}$ is then the number of SFCs who died the fight

against the PKK insurgency between the election at (t-2) and the election at (t-1); $V_{\{t-1,i,j\}}$ is the vote share of the party we are interested in in the (t-1) election; $N_{\{t-1,i,j\}}$ is the turnout rate; $K_{\{t-1,i,j\}}$ is the percentage of ethnically Kurdish population; $X_{\{t-1,i,j\}}$ is the vector of socioeconomic variables; $M_{\{t-1,i,j\}}$ is a dummy that takes on the value 1 if the county was under state of emergency in (t-1); and finally $S_{\{i,j\}}$ is a dummy variable that takes on the value 1 if the county has a border with Iraq, Syria, Iran, or Armenia.

We estimate the above equation for the 1995-1999 period (t=1999) using OLS with clustered errors at the province level[78]. Unfortunately we are not able to conduct a similar analysis for the 1991-1995 period to see whether the SFCs of the period was determined by the Kurdish and/or Turkish-nationalist votes in the 1991 general election since neither MHP nor HADEP entered the 1991 general elections. Table A.5 in the Appendix displays the results. None of the estimated βs are significant indicating that the data do not support the reverse causality hypothesis.

9. CONCLUSION

This study analyzes the effects of the Turkish-Kurdish ethnic conflict on the electoral choices of Turkish voters in the 1995 and 1999 general elections. The results demonstrate a significant positive association between the conflict and the vote shares of Kurdish and Turkish-nationalist parties, and as such, they indicate the polarization of the electorate along an ethnic nationalist cleavage. Given the completely opposing views of these parties on how to resolve the conflict, such a polarization does not actually bode well for a peaceful and timely resolution. It seems the conflict is leading people to mass behind two opposing groups with irreconcilable claims about the reasons of and solutions to the conflict. What the Turkish case is presenting us here is, in a sense, a circular structure with ethnic conflict feeding political polarization which then renders a peaceful and timely resolution more difficult, in other words, a *polarization trap*. Horowitz makes a

similar argument in his seminal work on ethnic conflicts when he talks about how ethnic parties may exacerbate ethnic conflict by coming up with "mutually incompatible" claims to power[79]. We argue that, along with the other results in the literature on the detrimental sociopolitical effects of civil conflicts, the polarization trap can shed further light on the self-perpetuating dynamics of these conflicts, and can help us better understand the reasons behind their resilience.

We also present some preliminary evidence that what we are observing is not just a political polarization along an ethnic nationalist dimension, but also a rise in the political salience of ethnic identities which then reflects on vote choice. The results of the ecological regressions reveal how the conflict increasingly brings ethnic identities to the forefront in vote choice, and thus, further deepens the ethnic cleavage in the society.

The observed ethnic nature of most civil conflicts has led scholars to devise and test various hypotheses on how conflict and the number of ethnic groups in a society are related[80]. Interestingly, a good portion of these failed to establish a clear association which then led scholars on a quest for better ethnic heterogeneity measures[81]. Note that while these studies significantly advance our understanding of ethnic conflicts, they all, implicitly or explicitly, assume that the salience of ethnic identity for any two co-ethnics will be the same for both and will remain fixed. In other words, they ignore the constructivist insight about the endogeneity of the salience of ethnic identities to ethnic conflict itself. The results in this paper support this insight. If it is not just ethnic identity itself but rather the salience of that identity that drives people's behavior, then this endogeneity might actually explain why scholars have so far not been able to establish a clear link between ethnicity and ethnic conflict even though they strongly suspect that it exists. We therefore close by emphasizing the need to find new and novel ways to incorporate the dynamic link between ethnic identity and ethnic conflict into our studies on such conflicts.

APPENDIX

Data Sources for Security Force Casualties:

Our main source for military casualties is a publication, named "Our Martyrs (Şehitlerimiz)", published by the Turkish Ministry of Defense in late 1998. The publication lists the names, ranks, and place of death of all Turkish soldiers who died in the fight against the PKK insurgency in the August 1984-September 1998 period. In total, the list contains information on 5554 soldiers. This publication actually provides the most credible, and accurate information on military casualties as the information is directly taken from the personnel archives of the Ministry of Defense. Unfortunately, the list covers casualties up to mid 1998, and detailed information on place of death is missing for gendermarie casualties. In order to bring the database up to date with detailed information on places of death, we referred to various other sources. We contacted the *Associations of the Families of Martyrs* [82] in 28 provinces. These associations are civil society organizations founded by families of soldiers and police officers who died in service, to help each other cope with the situation. They helped us greatly in gathering information about the SFCs from their area. We have also contacted and obtained information from numerous military bases in different parts of the country, and also the Gendarmerie Museum in Ankara which has an extensive database on gendarmerie casualties. Another important source has been the archives of daily newspapers. We searched through the daily archives of five major Turkish newspapers (Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, Zaman, Sabah, Hurriyet) for news on PKK attacks. Even though the newspapers did not cover all the attacks and all the casualties, they still provided information on a good deal of them. The internet has been another important source of information. We have conducted searches using related words like PKK, attack, Kurdish conflict, terror, martyr, etc. and skimmed through thousands of websites that came up on these searches. We referred to some 359 of these websites[83]. Most of them are commemorative sites maintained by local administrations including

governorships, municipalities, village associations, and civil society organizations. Finally, we obtained the information on the casualties of the police forces directly from the public relations office of the Administration of Security Forces.

TABLE A1: Effects of the Ethnic Conflict on the Vote Share of the Other Political Parties

Estimates from the mixed effects REML regressions

Number of obs.:1727 Number of groups:870	Dependent variable: ANAP's vote	Dependent variable: RP's vote	Dependent variable: CHP's vote	Dependent variable: DYP's vote	Dependent variable: DSP's vote
Constant	11.80** (5.10)	32.82*** (5.33)	-1.81 (3.64)	-2.59 (5.48)	39.74*** (4.20)
SFCs in the area since the previous election	**-0.056*** **(0.018)**	**-0.094*** **(0.019)**	**-0.024*** **(0.013)**	**-0.013** **(0.019)**	**0.009** **(0.015)**
Percentage of ethnically Kurdish population	-0.067** (0.034)	-0.064 (0.041)	0.034 (0.025)	-0.029 (0.033)	-0.074** (0.036)
Turnout	0.013 (0.038)	-0.079** (0.039)	-0.059** (0.027)	0.179*** (0.041)	-0.141*** (0.031)
Population size	-0.006*** (0.002)	0.005 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.006*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)
Population growth rate	0.081 (0.081)	0.101 (0.082)	-0.248*** (0.055)	-0.184** (0.088)	-0.008 (0.065)
Urbanization level	0.005 (0.016)	0.077*** (0.019)	0.001 (0.013)	-0.031* (0.017)	-0.032** (0.014)
Household size	0.182 (0.271)	1.110*** (0.296)	0.023 (0.203)	0.176 (0.287)	-2.193*** (0.224)
Unemployment rate	-0.06 (0.079)	-0.254*** (0.081)	-0.052 (0.056)	-0.062 (0.085)	0.002 (0.063)
Literacy rate	0.011 (0.035)	-0.224*** (0.042)	0.183*** (0.029)	0.047 (0.029)	0.029 (0.03)
Election dummy	6.155*** (0.422)	4.883*** (0.431)	2.795*** (0.297)	6.451*** (0.468)	-5.54*** (0.333)
State of emergency dummy	2.647* (1.534)	2.528* (1.337)	0.268 (0.897)	0.531 (1.708)	1.769 (1.179)
Variance Components					
Province level (ς^2)	4.96*** (0.442)	6.92*** (0.629)	3.63*** (0.362)	4.25*** (0.407)	7.04*** (0.637)
County level (τ^2)	3.27*** (0.221)	6.67*** (0.210)	4.92*** (0.149)	2.30*** (0.359)	3.53*** (0.152)
Observation level (σ^2)	5.31*** (0.129)	4.34*** (0.106)	2.95*** (0.072)	6.30*** (0.155)	3.83*** (0.093)
-2 Log Likelihood	11378	11695	10447	11660	10690

***:significant at 1% level; ** :significant at 5% level; * :significant at 10% level.

Robustness Checks:

Table A2: Effects of the Ethnic Conflict on Electoral Behavior Using an Alternative Conflict Measure

Estimates from the mixed effects REML regressions

# of observations:1727 # of groups:870	Dependent variable: HADEP's vote share	Dependent variable: MHP's vote share
Constant	5.875** (3.63)	17.77*** (5.02)
SFCs in the area since the previous election	**0.019***** **(0.003)**	**0.034***** **(0.005)**
Percentage of ethnically Kurdish population	0.204*** (0.024)	-0.166*** (0.037)
Turnout	-0.056** (0.026)	0.071** (0.036)
Population size	0.006*** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)
Population growth rate	0.180*** (0.053)	0.116 (0.077)
Urbanization level	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.016 (0.015)
Household size	0.971*** (0.197)	-1.213*** (0.263)
Unemployment rate	0.246*** (0.053)	0.122 (0.075)
Literacy rate	-0.067** (0.030)	0.040 (0.035)
Election dummy	-1.141*** (0.288)	-10.06*** (0.398)
State of emergency dummy	-0.478 (0.842)	3.260** (1.460)
Variance Components		
Province level (ς^2)	3.40*** (0.373)	6.31*** (0.577)
County level (τ^2)	5.02*** (0.148)	3.35*** (0.203)
Observation level (σ^2)	2.77*** (0.067)	4.87*** (0.121)
-2 Log Likelihood	10347	11211

***:significant at 1% level; ** :significant at 5% level; * :significant at 10% level.

TABLE A3: Effects of the Ethnic Conflict on Electoral Behavior Under Province Level Fixed Effects and County Level Clustered Errors Specification

Estimates from linear regressions, standard error adjusted for 870 clusters in county

Number of observations:1727	Dependent variable: HADEP's vote share	Dependent variable: MHP's vote share
Constant	8,651 (7.750)	21.809*** (5.827)
SFCs since the previous election	**0.097***** **(0.039)**	**0.072***** **(0.017)**
Percentage of ethnically Kurdish population	0.134*** (0.118)	0.156*** (0.090)
Turnout	-0.116** (0.046)	0.095** (0.039)
Population size	0.006** (0.003)	-0.005** (0.002)
Population growth rate	0.116 (0.090)	0.080 (0.086)
Urbanization level	-0.033* (0.016)	-0.013 (0.016)
Household size	1.024** (0.403)	-1.256*** (0.317)
Unemployment rate	0.452*** (0.122)	0.059 (0.079)
Literacy rate	-0.068*** (0.076)	0.079* (0.040)
Election dummy	-1.037 (0.643)	-9.500*** (0.439)
State of emergency dummy	-0.79 (0.665)	6.092** (0.849)
Parameter estimates for province dummies are not reported.		
R-Squared	0.6657	0.6757

***:significant at 1% level; ** :significant at 5% level; * :significant at 10% level.

TABLE A4: Effects of the Ethnic Conflict on HADEP's Vote Share When Outlier Observations are Excluded

	Dependent Variable: HADEP's Vote Share	Dependent Variable: MHP's Vote Share
Estimates from the mixed effects REML regressions	# of observations:1719 # of Provinces:80 # of counties: 868	# of observations:1714 # of Provinces:80 # of counties: 870
Constant	6.870** (2.983)	24.48*** (4.682)
SFCs since the previous election	**0.088***** **(0.011)**	**0.079***** **(0.016)**
Percentage of ethnically Kurdish population	0.207*** (0.022)	-0.142*** (0.036)
Turnout	-0.037* (0.022)	0.057* (0.035)
Population size	0.006*** (0.002)	-0.004** (0.002)
Population growth rate	0.137*** (0.045)	0.145** (0.075)
Urbanization level	-0.001 (0.011)	-0.013 (0.015)
Household size	0.834*** (0.170)	-1.313*** (0.251)
Unemployment rate	0.213*** (0.045)	0.091 (0.071)
Literacy rate	-0.094*** (0.025)	-0.021 (0.033)
Election dummy	-1.05*** (0.249)	-10.31*** (0.383)
State of emergency dummy	-0.35 (0.696)	3.477** (1.401)
Variance Components		
Province level (ς^2)	3.22*** (0.360)	6.23*** (0.566)
County level (τ^2)	5.01*** (0.141)	3.22*** (0.198)
Observation level (σ^2)	2.25*** (0.055)	4.66*** (0.118)
-2 Log Likelihood:	9903	10983

***:significant at 1% level; ** :significant at 5% level; * :significant at 10% level.

Reverse Causality Analyses:

TABLE A.5: Effects of Nationalist Votes on SFCs		
Linear Regressions with Robust, Clustered Errors at the Province Level		
Dependent Variable: Security force casualties in the 1995-1999 period		Number of Observations: 857
Constant	2.487 (4.215)	2.507 (4.536)
Vote share of HADEP in 1995 elections	**0.076** **(0.046)**	
Vote share of MHP in 1995 elections		**-0.033** **(0.027)**
SFCs in the 1991-1995 period	0.391*** (0.029)	0.400*** (0.031)
Percentage of ethnically Kurdish population	-0.024 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.019)
Turnout	-0.059 (0.029)	-0.054 (0.030)
Population size	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Population growth rate	-0.055 (0.044)	-0.039 (0.045)
Urbanization level	-0.002 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.009)
Household size	-0.150 (0.202)	-0.105 (0.227)
Unemployment rate	0.032 (0.087)	0.074 (0.090)
Literacy rate	0.043 (0.032)	0.039 (0.034)
Border dummy	-1.672 (1.463)	-1.235 (1.493)
State of emergency dummy	2.596* (1.347)	2.346 (1.486)
R-Squared	0.7912	0.7879
F(12, 78)	35.29	30.62
***:significant at 1% level; ** :significant at 5% level; * :significant at 10% level.		

Table A.6 Correlations between control variables	SFCs	Urbanization	Population growth	Kurdish population	State of emergency dummy	Literacy rate	Household size	Population	Turnout	Election dummy
SFCs	1									
Urbanization	-0.01	1								
Population growth	0.02	0.28	1							
Kurdish population	0.46	-0.03	0.06	1						
State of emergency dummy	0.47	-0.03	0.02	0.87	1					
Literacy rate	-0.39	0.35	0.10	-0.69	-0.60	1				
Household size	0.26	-0.24	0.02	0.65	0.53	-0.66	1			
Population	-0.01	0.40	0.28	0.04	-0.007	0.12	-0.09	1		
Turnout	-0.26	0.06	0.06	-0.37	-0.31	0.41	-0.44	-0.07	1	
Election dummy	0.08	-0.18	0.11	-0.0003	0.03	-0.38	0.09	-0.04	-0.34	1

ENDNOTES

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[4] Gary King, *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem*, (Princeton University Press, 1997).

[5] Eric D. Gould and Esteban F. Klor, "Does Terrorism Work?" *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* (November, 2006), pp.1459-1510; Berrebi and Klor, "Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism: Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate", *American Political Science Review* 102:3 (August, 2008), pp. 279-301; Claude Berrebi and Esteban F.Klor, "On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes: Theory and Evidence from the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 (December, 2006), pp. 899-925.

[6] Arzu Kıbrıs, "Funerals and Elections:The Effects of Terrorism on Voting Behavior in Turkey", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 55:2 (2011), pp.220-247.

[7] Berrebi and Klor, "Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism"; Gould and Klor, "Does Terrorism Work?"; Berrebi and Klor, "On Terrorism and Electoral Outcomes"; Kıbrıs, "Funerals and Elections:The Effects of Terrorism on Voting Behavior in Turkey".

[8] Wood, "The Social Processes of Civil War".

[9] KONDA Araştırma ve Danışmanlık, *Biz Kimiz, Toplumsal Yapı Araştırması* (2006)

[10] Gunes Murat Tezcur, "When Democratization Radicalizes: The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Turkey", *Journal of Peace Research* 47(6) (2010), pp. 775-789; Nergis Canefe, "Turkish Nationalism and Ethno-symbolic Analysis: The Rules of Exception", *Nations and Nationalism* 8(2) (2002), pp. 133–155; Mesut Yegen, "The Kurdish Question in the Turkish State Discourse", *Journal of Contemporary History* 34(4) (1999), pp. 555–568.

[11] Mustafa Saatci, "Nation-states and Ethnic Boundaries: Modern Turkish Identity and Turkish–Kurdish Conflict", *Nations and Nationalism* 8:4 (2002), pp. 549–564.

[12] Hamit Bozarslan, "Human rights and the Kurdish Issue in Turkey: 1984–1999", *Human Rights Review* 3:1 (2001), pp. 45–54; TBMM, *Faili Mechul Cinayetleri Arastırma Komisyonu Raporu* (Report of the Turkish Parliament Commission Investigating the Unidentified Murders), (Ankara, 1995); Gunes Murat Tezcur, "Judicial Activism in Perilous Times: The Turkish Case", *Law & Society Review* 43:2 (2009), pp.305–336; Tezcur, "When Democratization Radicalizes"; Joost Jongerden, "Contested Spaces in Landscapes of Violence: Displacement and Return in Diyarbakır at the Turn of the 21st Century", *Kurdische Studien* 4/5 (2004/2005), pp. 61–89.

[13] Nedim Şener, "26 Yilin Kanli Bilancosu", Milliyet, June 24, 2010.

[14] In various surveys conducted in the last decade, PKK terror was ranked the most important problem of the country by large percentages of respondents (see Yilmaz Esmer, *Devrim, Evrim, Statüko: Türkiye'de Sosyal, Siyasal ve Ekonomik Değerler* (TESEV, Istanbul, 1999); Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak, *Türkiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset* (TESEV, Istanbul, 2000); Ali Çarkoğlu and Binnaz Toprak, *Değisen Türkiye'de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset* (TESEV, Istanbul, 2006); Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Public Choice and Foreign Affairs: Democracy and International Relations in Turkey", *New Perspectives on Turkey,* May: 59-83 (2009); *Eurobarometer* Autumn 2004 and onward). For example, in a 1993 survey conducted by the Turkish Foundation for Social and Economic Research (TUSES), 45 percent of the respondents ranked the conflict as the most important problem of the country making it the most highest ranked problem. In a 1996 survey conducted by the same institution, 17 percent ranked it as the most important problem making it the second highest ranked problem. In November 1991, the then-prime minister Süleyman Demirel described the ''Kurdish situation'' as Turkey's top problem. In 1993, the then-president Turgut Özal, described the situation as ''perhaps the most significant problem in the republic's history'' (see Michael M. Gunter, *The Kurds and the Future of Turkey*, (New York: St. Martin's Press ,1997)).

[15] Ali Çarkoğlu and Melvin Hinich, "A Spatial Analysis of Turkish Party Preferences", *Electoral Studies* 25 (2006), pp. 369-392.

[16] MHP leaders have upheld the argument that Kurds are "overwhelmingly of Turkish descent".

[17] Gunter, *The Kurds and The Future of Turkey*; Kemal Kirişçi and Gareth M.Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of Trans-state Ethnic Conflict* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1997); Nimet Beriker, "The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Issues, Parties, and Prospects", *Security Dialogue* 28:4 (1997), pp. 439-452.

[18] In Turkey, people vote for parties and not for individual candidates. Thus, there is actually no way to identify the Kurdish-nationalist votes within the total votes SHP got in the 1995 elections.

[19] Gunter, *The Kurds and The Future of Turkey;* Kirişçi and Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey*; Gulistan Gurbey, "The Development of the Kurdish Nationalism Movement in Turkey since the 1980s", in *The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East*, edited by Robert Olson (The University Press of Kentucy, 1996); Joost Jongerden and Ahmet Hamdi Akkaya, "Born From the Left: The Making of the PKK" in *Nationalism and Politics in Turkey: Political Islam, Kemalism, and the Kurdish Issue*, edited by Marlies Casier and Joost Jongerden (Routledge Studies in Middle Eastern Politics, 2011)

[20] "What are the factors that are associated with the vote share of a specific political party?" and "What makes an individual voter more likely to vote for a specific political party?" are two different, nonetheless, very related questions. If there are certain individual characteristics that make a person more likely to vote for a specific party, then we would expect that party to get a high vote share in a society in which a significant number of voters share those characteristics. In that sense, understanding how ethnic conflicts are associated with individual vote choice can inform us about the association between ethnic conflicts and vote shares of political parties.

[21] Admittedly, not all agree on the importance of environmental factors in political behavior. As Zuckerman argues "the founders of the behavioral analysis of political preferences and electoral choices institutionalized a research agenda that departed from the social logic of politics." The heavy reliance on survey data that examined individual characteristics without much attention to the social context, coupled with the introduction of rational choice theory into the subject matter, led, for a period, to a focus on the individual level of analysis, and on individual attitudes and calculations as the main determinants of vote choice. Nevertheless, in the last decades the study of the social logic of political behavior has regained interest. For a comprehensive account of the academic debate on the individual versus social logic of political behavior and a detailed review of the related literature, please see Alan Zuckerman, "Returning to the Social Logic of Political Behavior", in *The Social Logic of Politics.Personal Networks as Contexts for Political Behavior*, edited by Alan S. Zuckerman (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005).

[22] Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); Robert Huckfeldt, *Politics in Context: Assimilation and Conflict in Urban Neighborhoods*, (New York: Agathon Press, 1986); Paul Allen Beck et al., "The Social Calculus of Voting: Interpersonal, Media, and Organizational Influences on Presidential Choices", *The American Political Science Review*. 96:1 (2002), pp.57-73; Alan S. Zuckerman, "Returning to the Social Logic of Political Behavior"; Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Martin Paldam, "Economics of Voting: An Introduction", *Electoral Studies* 19 (2000), pp. 113-121.

[23] Collier, "On the Economic Consequences of Civil War"; Collier et al., "Breaking the Conflict Trap".

[24] Wood, "The Social Processes of Civil War".

[25] D. Roderick Kiewiet, "Policy-Oriented Voting in Response to Economic Issues", *American Political Science Review* 75 (June, 2001), pp. 448–59; G. Rabinowitz, J.W. Prothro, and W. Jacoby, "Salience as a Factor in the Impact of Issues on Candidate Evaluation", *Journal of Politics* 44 (1982), pp.41-63.

[26] George C. Edwards III,, William Mitchell and Reed Welch, "Explaining Presidential Approval: The Significance of Issue Salience", *American Journal of Political Science* 39(1)(1995), pp.108-134; Eric Belanger and Bonnie Meguid, "Issue Salience, Issue Ownership, and Issue-Based Vote Choice", Electoral Studies 27 (2008) pp. 477-491.

[27] Edwards et al. "Explaining Presidential Approval"; Berrebi and Klor, "Are Voters Sensitive to Terrorism: Direct Evidence from the Israeli Electorate", *American Political Science Review* 102:3 (August, 2008), pp. 279-301.

[28] For a review please see Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler, Daphna Canetti, and Ami Pedahzur, "Two of a Kind? Voting Motivations for Populist Radical Right and Religious Fundamentalist Parties", *Electoral Studies* 29 (2010), pp.678-690.

[29] Carol Gordon and Asher Arian, "Threat and Decision Making", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45 (2001), pp. 196:215; Daphna Canetti et al., "An Exposure Effect? Evidence from a Rigorous Study on the Psycho-political Outcomes of Terrorism" in *The Political Psychology of Terrorism Fears,* edited by Samuel Justin Sinclair and Daniel Antonius (New York: Oxford University Press, in press).

[30] A. Arian, *Security Threatened: Surveying Israeli Opinion on Peace and War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995); A. Arian, "And Then There Were Two: On Demography and Politics in the Jewish Future", *Society* 36 (1999), pp.21-26; Berrebi and Klor, "Are Voters Sensitive".

[31] Chandra, "Cumulative Findings in the Study of Ethnic Politics"; Chandra, "What is Ethnic Identity; Wilkinson, "Constructivist Assumptions and Ethnic Violence".

[32] Kanchan Chandra and Steven Wilkinson, "Measuring the Effect of "Ethnicity"", *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (2008), pp.515-563.

[33] Chandra and Wilkinson, "Measuring the Effect of Ethnicity"; Nicholas Sambanis and Moses Shayo, "Social Identification and Ethnic Conflict", *American Political Science Review* 107:2 (2013), pp.294-325.

[34] Steven I. Wilkinson and Christopher J. Haid, "Ethnic Violence as Campaign Expenditure: Riots, Competition, and Vote Swings in India", working paper, Department of Political Science,Yale University.

[35] Wilkinson, "Constructivist Assumptions and Ethnic Violence".

[36] Arjun Appadurai, *Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger*, (Public Planet Books/Duke University Press, 2006)

[37] Alan Manning and Sanchari Roy, "Culture Clash or Culture Club? National Identity in Britain", *The Economic Journal* 120 (2010), pp. 72-100.

[38] Moses Shayo and Asaf Zussman, *Judicial Ingroup Bias in the Shadow of Terrorism*, *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 126 (2011), pp.1447-1484.

[39] Sambanis and Shayo, "Social Identification and Ethnic Conflict".

[40] Saatci, "Nation-states and Ethnic Boundaries".

[41] Daniel Byman, "The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism", *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 21 (1998), pp.149-169.

[42] Saatci, "Nation-states and Ethnic Boundaries".

[43] Note that due some administrative changes, some localities gained county status after the 1995 general election. For those counties the data set includes only the 1999 observation.

[44] Marco R. Steenbergen and Bradford S.Jones, "Modeling Multilevel Data Structures", *American Journal of Political Science* 46:1 (2002), pp. 218-237.

[45] As a result of the heavy and incessant PKK activities and attacks, a number of provinces were put under state of emergency in 1987, and most of them remained so all through the 90s. State of emergency brought many restrictions on the daily lives of the residents of these places, and the freedoms they should have normally enjoyed. Moreover, it meant transfer of military personnel to the area which meant some change in the voter profile of these locations. Thus, state of emergency itself can be an important determinant of electoral behavior.

[46] Note that because the conflict is geographically concentrated, SFC distributions over the years are very highly correlated. Consequently, the usage of number of SFCs over shorter periods of time before the elections leads only to scale effects rather than any substantial changes in the results.

[47] Şener, "26 Yilin Kanli Bilancosu".

[48] David A. Jaeger and M. Daniele Paserman, "The Cycle of Violence? An Empirical Analysis of Fatalities in the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict", *American Economic Review*, 98:4 (2008), pp:1591-1604.

[49] Benny Geys, "Explaning Voter Turnout: A Review of Aggregate Level Research", *Electoral Studies* 25 (2006), pp. 637-663.

[50] Lewis-Beck and Paldam, "Economics Voting: An Introduction".

[51] Şerif Mardin, "Center Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?" in *Political Participation in Turkey*, edited by Engin Akarlı and Gabriel Ben-Dor (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Press, 1975).

[52] Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Elections and Party Preferences in Turkey, Changes and Continuities in the 1990s", *Comparative Political Studies* 27:3 (1994), pp. 402-424; Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, "Public Choice and Foreign Affairs: Democracy and International Relations in Turkey", *New Perspectives on Turkey* 40 (2009), pp. 57-81; Yılmaz Esmer, "At the Ballot Box", in *Politics, Parties, and Elections in Turkey*, edited by Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer (Boulder Co.:Lynne Rienner Pub., 2002); Yılmaz Esmer, "Parties and the Electorate: A Comparative Analysis of Voter Profiles of Turkish Political Parties", in *Turkey-Political, Social, and Economic Challenges in the 1990s*, edited by Çiğdem Balım et al. (Leiden, New York: E.J.Brill, 1995)

[53] Çarkoğlu and Hinich, "A Spatial Analysis of Turkish Party Preferences".

[54] The red areas have more than 100 SFCs; the pink areas have 50 to 100; the grey areas have 30 to 50; the orange areas have 10 to 30; the green areas have 1 to 10; and the yellow areas have none.

[55] 1995 general elections were the first in which a Kurdish nationalist party competed. The Kurdish-nationalist party did not compete in the 2007 and 2011 general elections either, instead a number of its members ran as independent candidates from a limited number of electoral regions. Note that, the Turkish-nationalist MHP did not enter the 1991 elections either.

[56] Because violence may affect demographic variables like population growth rate and urbanization rate through its effect on migratory flows, the usage of year 2000 values of socioeconomic indicators as controls for the 1999 elections may lead to an identification problem. We argue that in this case such a concern is not warranted for several reasons: First of all the census was taken only a year after the elections, and we would not expect the demographic variables to change dramatically in just one year. Relatedly, the population growth rate is an average for the 1990-2000 period and consequently is not expected to be much different from an average for the 1990-1999 period. Second, the PKK announced a ceasefire shortly after the 1999 elections. Because of the ceasefire we would not expect to see a significant amount of violence related migratory outflows from conflict areas between the 1999 elections and the 2000 census. Moreover, we would not expect those who had escaped from violence before to return home as one year would not really be enough to convince people to do so.

[57] The ideological classification of parties follows closely the widely used classification in Turkish electoral studies (Kalaycıoğlu, "Elections and Party Preferences in Turkey"; Esmer, "At the Ballot Box"; Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, *Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, Protest, and Stability in an Islamic Society* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007)

[58] Bülent Dinçer and Metin Özaslan, *İlçelerin Sosyo-Ekonomik Gelişmişlik Sıralaması Araştırması,* Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı (1996; 2004)

[59] Servet Mutlu, "Ethnic Kurds in Turkey", *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 28:4 (1996), pp. 517-541.

[60] For example, if 50% of the 1990 residents of county X were born in province A which, according to Mutlu, had 30% ethnic Kurds in 1965, and the other 50% was born in province B which had 10% ethnic Kurds in 1965, then our expectation for county X is to have a population with 20% ethnic Kurds in 1990.

[61] KONDA Araştırma ve Danışmanlık, "*Biz Kimiz"*.

[62] REML and unrestricted/full maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) produce identical fixed effects estimates. Their estimates for variance components will also be the same for large samples, but because REML corrects for the degrees of freedom consumed by estimation of the fixed effects, for small samples, MLE is biased toward lower variance estimates (Steenbergen and Jones, "Modeling Multilevel Data Structures"; Jeremy J. Albright and Dani M.Marinova *Estimating Multilevel Models Using SPSS, Stata, SAS, and R*, mimeo (Indiana University, 2010)

[63] To create this chart, we used the estimated coefficients and their covariances as the means and the covariances of a multivariate normal distribution from which we drew 100000 simulated coefficients. Then we fixed SFCs at zero, the election dummy at 1, the martial law dummy at 0, and the remaining controls at their mean values for 1995, and by multiplying each of the simulated coefficient vectors with this fixed control variables vector, we calculated 100000 expected HADEP vote shares, whose density is depicted by the bell-shaped curve on the left. Then we drew another set of simulated coefficients, fixed SFCs at 17 and holding all other controls constant, calculated another set of expected HADEP vote shares, whose density is depicted by the bell-shaped curve on the right.

[64] Note that these correlations are not high enough to cause any concern of multicollinearity. In any case, multicollinearity does not bias the estimates, it may only render them statistically insignificant, which is not a problem here.

[65] Also note that the election dummy signals a sizable jump in especially MHP's vote share in the 1999 election. Actually this jump is also very much related to the conflict. As mentioned before PKK's leader was captured by Turkish security forces shortly before the election in 1999. This led to a rise in ethnic nationalist sentiments in both ethnic groups. The success of the security forces and the heavy blow the PKK received as a result gave the MHP the opportunity to argue that they were right all along in their support for military solutions and to surf to the parliament on the raising wave of Turkish ethnic-nationalist sentiments in the 1999 election.

[66] Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara, Ian Budge, and Michael McDonald, *Mapping Policy Preferences II. Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments in Eastern Europe, the European Union and the OECD, 1990-2003* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Çarkoğlu and Hinich, "A Spatial Analysis of Turkish Party Preferences"; Gunter, *The Kurds and The Future of Turkey;* Kirişçi and Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey;* Beriker, "The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey".

[67] Klingemann et al. *Mapping Policy Preferences II*; Çarkoğlu and Hinich, "A Spatial Analysis of Turkish Party Preferences".

[68] Wood, "The Social Processes of Civil War".

[69] Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1976)

[70] Collier et al., "Breaking the Conflict Trap".

[71] Chaim Kaufmann, "Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars", International Security 20:4 (1996), pp. 136-175; Collier et al., "Breaking the Conflict Trap; Paul Collier and Anka Hoeffler, *Civil War*. Draft Chapter for the Handbook of Defense Economics (2006)

[72] Due to space limitations we are not able to go into a methodological description.Those interested are kindly requested to refer to King, *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem.*

[73] Note that ethnic Turks here refer to ethnically non-Kurdish populations of Turkey. While it is true that there exist other small ethnic minorities in Turkey, we base our referral of non-Kurdish populations as "ethnically Turkish" on the fact that these other groups are relatively very small. Moreover, according to a recent survey study, most of them consider themselves coming from a Turkic ethnic background (like Balkan Turks, Gagauz Turks, Asian Turks, or Caucasian Turks) (KONDA, *Biz Kimiz*). Consequently, that study puts the total number of ethnic Turks and Kurds to around 98.5% of the population.

[74] King's methodology requires that we make three assumptions: a) that ethnic HADEP (MHP) votes are distributed according to a truncated bivariate normal distribution; b) that their expected values are independent of the ethnic composition; c) that HADEP (MHP) votes across counties are independent after conditioning on ethnic composition. Admittedly ,the second assumption is the most likely one to fail in the Turkish context. King suggests plotting estimated county level ethnic Kurdish (Turkish) votes for HADEP (MHP) against the percentage of ethnic Kurds (Turks) across counties as a diagnostic for the presence of an aggregation bias. The plots indicate some small bias but not enough to warrant discarding the analysis.

[75] Note that the estimated coefficient for the effect of casualties on ethnic Kurdish votes for MHP is positive (albeit very small) and significant. One explanation for this might be the village guards system. Because there are ethnic Kurds who make money out of this system, MHP's strong support for the continuation of the system might have appealed to them.

[76] Neighboring counties to a county are those that border that county.

[77] We have also conducted jackknife cross validation which re-estimates the model parameters by resampling serially leaving one county out each time. The mean and the variance of the distribution of the parameter estimates from these iterations are very close to the original results. The results are available upon request.

[78] Note that because we can only analyze the casualties of the 1995-1999 period, we have only one observation at the county level, and consequently the possible correlation of error terms within counties is not a problem anymore. But we still have the clustering of counties within provinces. we use OLS with clustered errors to account for the possibility of intraprovince correlation of errors. Note also that the existence of the lagged dependent variable in the model renders a random or fixed effects model unsuitable.

[79] Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict.*

[80] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, *Greed and Grievance in Civil War*, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2355 (World Bank, 2000); Nicholas Sambanis, "What is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (2004), pp. 814-58; Havard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis "Sensitivity Analysis of the Empirical Literature on Civil War Onset", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 (2006), pp. 508-35; Randall J. Blimes, "The Indirect Effect of Ethnic Heterogeneity On The Likelihood of Civil War Onset", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50 (2006), pp.536-47; Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, "How Much War Will We See? Explaining The Prevalence of Civil War", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46 (2002), pp.307-34; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War", *The American Political Science Review* 97:1 (2003), pp. 75-90; James Fearon, Kimuli Kasara, and David Laitin, "Ethnic Minority Rule and Civil War Onset", *American Political Science Review* 101:1 (2007), pp. 187-93.

[81] James Fearon, "Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country", *Journal of Economic Growth* 8:2 (2003), pp.195-222; Posner, "The Implications of Constructivism"; Marta Reynal-Querol, "Ethnicity, Political Systems, and Civil War", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46:1 (2002), pp. 29-54; Jose G. Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol, "Ethnic Polarization, Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars", *The American Economic Review* 95:3 (2005),pp. 796-816.

[82] Security force casualties are referred to as "martyrs" in Turkey.

[82] The list of these websites are available upon request.